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Thursday, August 06, 2009 - 6:05 AM
| By Louis J Sheehan Esquire |
No. 50
August 20, 1941
#722.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Part 1 of 2) During
my conversation with a member of the Cabinet, he remarked, "The
President has a broadminded view of the world and is not anti-Japanese.
In his past speeches and in his recent statement he had never referred
to Japan. As soon as he returned to Washington he had the Secretary of
State take up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conference
and replied to you. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire This is an unprecedented
thing and it seems that Japan should reciprocate in a like manner." So
I replied by saying that it was with a strong resolution that the
Japanese Government had come thus far in dealing with this question;
whereupon the Cabinet member replied, "It is equally true in the case
of the President. Above all, even if there is no real justification for
it, the country is replete with anti-Japanese sentiment." Trans. 8-21-41
No. 51
August 20, 1941
#722.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Part 2 of 2) "And
when the atmosphere in Congress is just as bad, if this fact leaks out
there is no doubt that a strong opposition will be made, but if the
conference succeeds and as a result peace is maintained in the Pacific,
the people will for the first time----------. Since I myself had
endeavored in the same direction, the success would make me feel that
life is worth living. Inasmuch as there is no way of telling whether
the President will continue to take such an open-hearted attitude in
the future, I earnestly wish that a way could be found to successfully
settle this question." Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Trans. 8-21-41
No. 52
August 17, 1941
#708.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) English text. (Part 1 of 8) (Strictly Confidential) Reference
is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on 8
August during a conversation with the Secretary of State, whether it
might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese
Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view
to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the
United States and Japan might be brought about.
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET The thought of Prince Konoye and of the
Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated. [A-31] Reference
is also made to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during
a call on the Secretary of State on 16 August, that there be resumed
the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two
governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for
negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire
Pacific situation. (Part 2 of 8[a]) (Part 3 of 8) On
two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to
instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese
Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to
acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French
Indo-China. Subsequently, on July 20 and July 23 the Acting Secretary
of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese
Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French
Indo-China and pointed out that the government of the United States
could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indo-China or
the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted
notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a
step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the
South Pacific area. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The Acting Secretary
pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial
to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and
to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands. (Part 4 of 8) The
government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to
inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this government,
the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to
remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful
settlement in the Pacific area. Informal discussions between the
Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed
toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations
relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation
would naturally envisage the working out of a program attainable by
peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or
suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United
States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in
conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has
long been committed. (Part 5 of 8[a]) (Part 6 of 8) If
such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to
be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or
areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations
resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this government
and this government would cooperate with other nations in extending
assistance to any country threatened. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET
Under
such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the
government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan
affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country
to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to
obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential
character. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(Part 7 of 8) In
those areas where the production and distribution of essential
commodities are vested in monopolies, the government of the United
States would expect to use its influence to see that [A-32] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price. If
the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its
objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program
above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan
satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much
greater certainty than could any other program. In case the
Japanese government feels that Japan desires and is in position to
suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to
embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the
program and principles to which the United States is committed, the
government of the United States would be prepared to consider
resumption of the informal explanatory discussions which were
interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable
time and place to exchange views. (Part 8 of 8) The
government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the
circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations
between the two governments, it would be helpful to both governments,
before entering a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with
plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to
furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its
present attitude and plans, just as this government has repeatedly
outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans. [a] Parts 2 and 5 are attached hereto. Trans. 8-21-41
No. 53
August 17, 1941
#708.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (English text.) (Part 2 of 8) When
the Japanese Ambassador brought up the suggestions, the Secretary of
State reminded the Ambassador that the government of the United States
had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that
course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a
desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador
that while proceeding along this course this government had received
reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting
courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent
conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had
been predicated. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET It was pointed out also
that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of
encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially
inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of
State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the
two governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed
while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that
the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a
campaign against the United States. (Part 5 of 8) The
program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the
application in the entire Pacific area of the principles of equality of
commercial opportunity and treatment. It [A-33] would
thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all
other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation
by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward
utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and
progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only
their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive
capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the
purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise
standards of living, and to create conditions conductive to the
maintenance of peace. Trans. 8-22-41
No. 54
August 21, 1941
#725.
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo According
to reports along the lines of those contained in my #722[a], there are
indications that the President himself is becoming seriously interested
in participating in the resumption of the negotiations to revise
Japanese-U.S. relations. It is even said that the latter half of the
note which I sent to you as my message #708[a], was composed by the
President himself. I have also heard that he expects to have me hand
our reply to that note directly to him. For these reasons, I believe
that it would be well if we omitted all of the involved and complicated
points in the composition of our reply and instead have it in the most
simple and direct phraseology as possible. In my opinion, I think it
would be to our interest if we omitted expressions like "continuance of
encirclement" as it appears in section three of my message #724[c].
Other corrections which I would make would include the changing of the
phrase "of discrimination, of boycott, and barriers, of personal
integrities and attack" as it appears in Section 18, to, simply,
"circumstances in the recent pact". I also feel that it is essential
that we point out the fact that we place much emphasis on the point
concerning the guaranteeing of the safety of the Far East.
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET
[a] See III, 50, 51—Nomura
reports the gist of a conversation with a Cabinet member in which he is
told of President Roosevelt's interest in the proposed conference (with
Konoye) and of his (the Cabinet member's) hope for its success.
[b] See III, 52, 53—Text of memorandum handed Amb. Nomura by the President.
[c] See III, 56-62—Text of Amb. Nomura's (proposed) reply to the President's note. Trans. 8-25-41
No. 55
August 20, 1941
#723.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Part 1 of 2) It
seems that the President believes that he could meet with Premier
KONOYE depending on the circumstances (my #722[a]). It is not hard to
imagine that he is also of the opinion that he would like to take this
matter out of the hands of the authorities and settle it himself
because of the general situation. It may be said that the President had
made this proposal so that he could make his last political stroke at
this moment when Japanese-American feelings are at their worst. It is
well for Japan to respond in a like generous spirit to this move on the
part of the President. It would be well also to leave the decisions of
the concrete points until some future date-----and show that there is
nothing that would conflict with-----and I think it is imperative that
we thus bring about the resumption of the informal negotiations which
have been disrupted. [A-34] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR From
this standpoint, I am submitting a proposal we have drawn up (-----
724[b]). There may be points in it that need to be dealt with more in
detail. Should I think of any points that should be added I will wire
them later. This proposal gives due respect to the policy proposed by
the United States Government. [a] See III, 50, 51.
[b] See III, 56-62. Trans. 8-25-41
| By Louis J Sheehan Esquire |
STAFFERS SEE WHAT IT'S LIKE TO "GO UNDER"
The
editors at Scientific American pride themselves on their skepticism
toward pseudoscience and on their hard-nosed insistence on solid
research. So in 2001 they invited Michael R. Nash of the University of
Tennessee at Knoxville and research psychologist Grant Benham to New
York City so they could see what hypnosis was like firsthand. Six
editorial staffers — three men and three women, none of whom had been
hypnotized before — were willing to give it a try. The outcome
surprised them. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Nash and Benham
set up two quiet offices. Each researcher hypnotized three people
individually, spending about an hour with each subject. They took each
volunteer through the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scales, which
rate an individual's responsiveness from 0 to 12.
One of the
most surprising things about the hypnotic experience was its very
banality. To induce hypnosis. Nash and Benham merely asked the staffers
to stare at a yellow Post-It note on the wall and spoke in a calm voice
about how relaxed they were becoming and how their eyes were growing
tired. "Your whole body feels heavy — heavier and heavier," they read
from the Stanford script. "You are beginning to feel drowsy — drowsy
and sleepy. More and more drowsy and sleepy while your eyelids become
heavier and heavier, more and more tired and heavy." That soothing
patter went on for roughly 15 minutes, after which all but one
volunteer had closed his or her eyes without being directly told to do
so.
The Stanford scales consist of 12 different activities
ranging from trying to pull apart one's interlocked fingers and feeling
one's elevated arm lower involuntarily to hallucinating that one hears
a buzzing fly. Of the six subjects, one scored an 8, one a 7, one a 6,
two a 4 and one a 3. (A score of 0 to 4 is considered "low"
hypnotizable; 5 to 7 is "medium" hypnotizable; 8 to 12 is "high"
hypnotizable.) No one accurately predicted how susceptible they would
be: some who thought themselves very suggestible turned out to be poor
subjects, and others who deemed themselves tough cases were surprised
to find their two outstretched arms coming together by themselves or
their mouth clamped shut so that they couldn't say their name.
Everyone
had a sense of "watching" themselves and were sometimes amused. "I knew
what my name was. but I couldn't think how to move my mouth," recalled
one staff member. Another said his fingers "felt stuck" during the
finger-lock exercise. "At first they pulled apart easily enough, but
then they seemed to sort of latch up. It was interesting to see that it
was so difficult."
Only one person experienced item number 12
on the Stanford scale — posthypnotic amnesia. In this exercise, the
hypnotist tells the subject not to remember what occurred during the
session. "Every time I'd try to remember," said the staff member who
had this sensation, "the only thing that came back to me was that I
shouldn't remember. But when Dr. Benham said it was okay to remember,
it all came flooding back." http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US
In
general, the experience was much less eerie than expected. The feeling
was akin to falling into a light doze after you've awakened in the
morning but while you're still in bed. All of the volunteers found that
they felt less hypnotized during some parts of the session than during
others, as if they had come near the "surface" for a few moments and
then slipped under again. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
All in
all, the staff concluded that seeing is believing when it comes to
hypnosis. Or maybe hearing is believing: I'm the one who heard — and
swatted — the imaginary fly.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US
PHOTO
(COLOR): People are aware of what they do during hypnosis, although
their actions feel Involuntary. Some laugh at their Inability to say
their name or open their eyes under hypnotic suggestion.
~~~~~~~~
| By Louis J Sheehan Esquire |
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